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Towards the Most Eﬃcient Scheme
(A Pedagogical Remark)
Olga Kosheleva and Vladik Kreinovich
University of Texas at El Paso
El Paso, TX 79968, USA
olgak@utep.edu, vladik@utep.edu
Abstract
In many economic and financial applications, it is important to have
secure communications. At present, communication security is provided
mostly by RSA coding, but the emergent quantum computing can break
this encoding, thus making it not secure. One way to make communications absolutely secure is to use quantum encryption. The existing
schemes for quantum encryption are aimed at agent-to-agent communications; however, in practice, we often need secure multi-agent communications, where each of the agents has the ability to securely send messages
to everyone else. In principle, we can repeat the agent-to-agent scheme for
each pair of agents, but this requires a large number of complex preliminary quantum communications. In this paper, we show how to minimize
the number of such preliminary communications – without sacrificing reliability of the all-pairs scheme.
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Need for Secure Group Communications

Need for secure communications. In e-commerce and e-ﬁnance, it is important to preserve privacy and conﬁdentiality of all the transactions. In other
words, we need to make sure that e-commerce and e-ﬁnance are based on a
secure communication scheme.
How communications are made secure now. At present, secure communications are based mostly on the RSA algorithm; see, e.g., [1]. In this scheme,
the communicator A selects two large prime numbers P1 and P2 that he/she
keeps private, and releases their product P = P1 · P2 into the public domain.
This public code P can then be used any anyone to encode the messages they
send to A. To decode the messages, one needs to know the factors P1 and P2 .
Since A knows these factors, A can decode these messages.
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The security of this encoding scheme is provided by the fact that no eﬃcient
algorithm is known for factoring large integers – and RSA algorithms use 100digit and longer factors Pi . In principle,
we can factor an integer P by trying
√
all possible prime numbers p ≤ P . This works for √
small P , but√for a number
with 100 decimal digits, testing all prime numbers ≤ P requires 10100 = 1050
computational steps – which make this procedure much longer than the lifetime
of the Universe.
Why we need quantum communications. For factoring large integers on
the usual computers, no eﬃcient algorithm is known. However, it is known
that if we consider quantum computers, then factoring large integers becomes
feasible; see, e.g., [4, 5, 6, 8]. At present, we do not yet have quantum computers
powerful enough to decode the usual RSA message, but engineers are designing
more and more powerful quantum computers, and sooner or later RSA-encoded
communications will no longer be secure.
Good news is that the same quantum physics that makes RSA not secure also
provides us with a secure way to communicate, known as quantum cryptography;
see, e.g., [3, 4, 8]. In contrast to quantum computing, which is mostly the thing
of the future, quantum cryptography is a practical scheme, it has been used for
decades already.
In this scheme – it is described in some detail in the appendix – two agents
that want to communicate in the future exchange quantum signals. By analyzing
these signals, they come up with a sequence s = s1 s2 . . . sn of bits (0s and 1s)
s1 , s2 , . . . , sn which they both know but which is not known to anyone else.
This sequence of 0s and 1s can then be used as one-time pad. Namely, if one
of the two agents needs to send a message m = m1 m2 . . . mn consisting of bits
m1 , . . . , mn , then:
• the sender computes and send the encoded signal e = s ⊕ m, where
def

(s ⊕ m)i = si ⊕ mi
and ⊕ means addition modulo 2 – which diﬀers by the usual addition of
bits only when si = mi = 1, in which case 1 ⊕ 1 = 0;
• the receiver, after getting the signal, reconstructs the original message as
m = s ⊕ e.
Indeed, for addition modulo 2, we always have a ⊕ a = 0, hence
s ⊕ e = s ⊕ (s ⊕ m) = (s ⊕ s) ⊕ m = 0 ⊕ m = m.
Once the message is sent, the pair of agents again perform preliminary quantum communications and generate a new one-time pad, etc.
Need for multi-agent communications. In economic and ﬁnancial applications, it is often important to have multi-agent communications. Such communications are especially important for decentralized schemes (like blockchain-based
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schemes), where each record of ﬁnancial transactions is stored in many diﬀerent
locations.
In such a scheme, we have several agents. Let us denote the overall number
of agents who need to communicate with each other by N . The system should
be ready for each of these agents A1 , . . . , AN to send communication to everyone
else.
Using pairwise communication scheme for multi-agent communication: a straightforward idea. In principle, we should be ready for commuN · (N − 1)
nications between each pair of agents. For N agents, there are
2
such pairs. So, a straightforward idea is to repeat the quantum-communication
N · (N − 1)
protocol for each pair (Aj , Ak ) and thus get
one-time pads s(j,k)
2
corresponding to these pairs.
If agent Aj needs to send a message to all the other agents A1 , A2 , . . . Aj−1 ,
Aj+1 , . . . , An , this agent will use a one-time pad s(j,k) to communicate with
the k-th agent.
N · (N − 1)
Can we do it more eﬃciently? The above scheme requires
pre2
liminary quantum communications – and preliminary quantum communications
are the most complex part of the general quantum communication protocol. Can
we have fewer preliminary quantum communications?
We can do it, but at the expense of reliability. One possibility to have a
more eﬃcient multi-communication scheme is to select one agent as a hub and
set up one-time pads between this selected agent and everyone else. This way,
we have a secure communication channel between the hub agent and every other
agent.
Then, if an agent Aj wants to transmit a message to everyone else, this agent
ﬁrst sends this message to the hub agent, and then the hub agent sends it to
everyone else.
This scheme is eﬃcient – it needs only N − 1 preliminary quantum communications – but it is not as reliable as the original scheme: indeed, if the hub
agent is not functioning well (which happens), then the original scheme still
works while the hub scheme does not. So, we arrive at the following question.
Can we have an eﬃcient scheme without decreasing reliability: formulation of the problem and our answer. Can we have an eﬃcient scheme
without decreasing reliability?
In this paper, we show that this is indeed possible: namely, we provide a
multi-agent communication scheme which is maximally eﬃcient and at the same
time as reliable as the all-pairs scheme.

3

2

Towards the Optimal Multi-Agent Quantum
Communication Protocol

Lower bound on the number of preliminary quantum communications. The only way to have secure communications is to have a secure onetime pad provided by preliminary quantum communications. A pair of agents
may get a one-time pad either directly from the mutual preliminary quantum
communication, or by somehow combining one-time pads provided by other
pairs.
Each agent can thus securely communicate only with agents which are either
directly connected with this agent by preliminary quantum communications, or
connected by a chain in which each agent is connected to the next one by
preliminary quantum communications between them.
Since we want each agent to be able to securely communicate with any other
agent, every two agents must be connected by such a chain. We start with a
single agent. At each point, we have a set of agents that can be thus connected
with the agent A1 . Each new preliminary quantum agent-to-agent communication adds may add one agent to this list – if it connects this new agent with
one of the agents which are already on this list. Thus, each new comunication
adds no more than one new agent to this list. We start with a single agent,
so after performing k agent-to-agent preliminary quantum communications, we
add no more than k agents to the original list, and thus, we have ≤ k + 1 agents
connected to A1 . We want to have all N agents connected to A1 , so we must
have N ≤ k + 1 and thus, k ≥ N − 1.
This is the desired lower bound: to enable each agent to securely communicate with every other agent, we need to perform at least N − 1 agent-to-agent
preliminary quantum communications.
Towards a scheme that implements this lower bound. Let us show that
it is possible to have a secure communication protocol that requires exactly
N − 1 agent-to-agent preliminary quantum communications. Due to what we
have just shown, this algorithm is the most eﬃcient one – in the sense that it
requires the smallest possible number of agent-to-agent preliminary quantum
communications.
Let one of the agents – let us denote this agent by A1 – perform the preliminary step of quantum communication with every other agent A1 , . . . , Am . As
a result, for each j = 2, 3, . . . , N , both A1 and Aj know a one-time pad s(j) –
which no one else knows.
Then, A1 uses a random number generator to generate a random string s
and then sends by an open channel, to each agent Aj , a string s ⊕ s(j) . Each
agent can reconstruct s as (s⊕s(j) )⊕s(j) . Thus, all N agents now have the same
one-time pad s that they can use for the future multi-agent communication.
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A

Quantum Communication: A Brief Reminder

Quantum background: a brief reminder. In quantum mechanics (see, e.g.,
[2, 7]) each bit, in addition to the usual two states 0 and 1 (which are denoted
by |0⟩ and |1⟩), it is also possible to have a superposition c0 · |0⟩ + c1 · |1⟩, where
ci are complex numbers for which |c0 |2 + |c1 |2 = 1. If in this state, we try to
ﬁnd out whether we have 0 or 1, we get 0 with probability |c0 |2 and 1 with
probability |c1 |2 .
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In particular, the standard quantum communication algorithm uses the following two states:
1
def 1
|0′ ⟩ = √ · |0⟩ + √ · |1⟩
2
2
and

1
def 1
|1′ ⟩ = √ · |0⟩ − √ · |1⟩.
2
2

To reconstruct the state, we need to use a measuring instrument. A measuring instrument can be tuned:
• either to detect the usual states |0⟩ and |1⟩ (we will denote this by +)
• or to detect the quantum states |0′ ⟩ and |1′ ⟩ (we will denote this tuning
by ×).
In this case:
• If the measuring instrument’s tuning matches the signal – e.g., if the signal
is |0⟩ or |1⟩ and the instrument is tuned on |0⟩ or |1⟩ – then the instrument
reconstructs the original signal.
• On the other hand, if there is a mismatch between the instrument’s tuning
and the signal – e.g., if the signal is |0′ ⟩ or |1′ ⟩ while the instrument is
tuned on |0⟩ or |1⟩ – then, irrespective of the signal, the instrument returns
0 or 1 equal with probability 1/2, and the original signal is lost.
The actual quantum communication scheme. The sending agent A runs,
several times, a random number generator that generates 0 or 1 with equal
probability 1/2. As a result, we get a multi-bit sequence r1 . . . rc . Then, A
runs the same random number generator n more times, generating c more bits
t1 . . . tc . For each i:
• if ti = 0, then A uses the + tuning to send the signal ti , i.e., sends |0⟩ if
ri = 0 and sends |1⟩ if ri = 1;
• if ti = 0, then A uses the × tuning to send the signal ti , i.e., sends |0′ ⟩ if
ri = 0 and sends |1′ ⟩ if ri = 1.
The receiving agent B also runs its own random random number generator,
generating yet another sequence b1 , . . . , bc of c bits. Then, for each i:
• if bi = 0, then B uses the + tuning to measure the received signal, and
• if bi = 1, then B uses the × tuning to measure the received signal.
For those bits for which there is a match between the signal and the tuning,
i.e., for which ti = bi , B gets exactly the original signal ri . For every other
index i, the result of B’s measurements is 0 or 1 with probability 1/2 – and the
original signal ri is lost.
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Now, A openly sends, to B, all the bits ti . In half of the cases, bi coincides
with ti . The agent B sends, to A, the list of such i’s. For these i’s – and there
are c/2 such i’s – both agents know the value ri . The sequence of all these
common values is the desired one-time pad of length n ≈ c/2 that A and B can
now use to securely communicate.
Why is this scheme secure. The security of this scheme is based on the fact
that an eavesdropped does not know which tuning was used for each bit i. If
the eavesdropper tries to measure the signal, it will thus, in half of the cases,
use the wrong tuning, and thus, the original signal will be lost – i.e., replaced
with a random bit.
As a result, even for some of the bits for which ti = bi , due to this replacement, the bits measured by B will be, in general, diﬀerent from ri . To
detect eavesdropping, A also sends to B, by open channel, some of the bits ri
corresponding to the cases when ti = bi .
• If for some i, B measured a bit diﬀerent from ri , this means that there
was an eavesdropper.
• If all the test-bits ri are reproduced by B exactly – this means that the
channel was secure, there was no eavesdropping.
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